Marketing / Advertising / Brand Teardown — OSB & iGaming Operator Capability Series
MGM Resorts International
NYSE: MGM · Hospitality parent; OSB/iGaming via BetMGM (50% JV, equity-method) + LeoVegas (consolidated) · FY ends 31-Dec · Currency USD · Tier-1 reference: FanDuel · Trailing reference: theScore Bet (PENN)
Source tiers F filing / disclosed · P press / trade-media · E estimated / triangulated (order-of-magnitude) · G gap (not found)
Scope note — read this first; the entity structure shapes everything
"MGM Resorts International" is a hospitality/casino parent, not a pure OSB operator. Its betting/iGaming marketing runs through three different organisations that do not consolidate into one S&M line: (a) the land-based resort brand + MGM Rewards loyalty machine (consolidated; advertising sits in G&A); (b) BetMGM — US OSB/iGaming, a 50/50 JV with Entain, equity-method and OFF MGM’s balance sheet, so its marketing spend is not a line in MGM’s accounts; and (c) LeoVegas — MGM’s wholly-owned, consolidated international iGaming arm. The spend centerpiece below is therefore deliberately split into non-additive tracks. Where a figure is JV-level or brand-specific it is labelled as such.
0 · Scorecard
Marketing-Maturity Tier
Strong Challenger (in OSB) / Tier-1 (in iGaming & loyalty)
◕ Spend Eff. | ◕ Unit Econ. | ◕ Brand | ● Channel Mix | ◕ Sponsorship | ● Loyalty / Promo | ◑ Reg. Posture |
Harvey-ball scale ○ Unfit / Trailing◔ Weak◑ Moderate◕ Strong● Excellent / Leading
Headline read
MGM is a split-personality marketing operator: a clear Tier-1 leader in iGaming and loyalty, but only a Strong Challenger (third place) in online sports betting. Via BetMGM it holds ~21% US iGaming GGR share (#2 in casino) but only ~8% OSB share — a distant third behind FanDuel and DraftKings — for a ~13% combined GGR share. FY2025 was the inflection: BetMGM net revenue $2.8B (+33%), first full-year positive EBITDA (+$220M, a $464M swing) and $270M returned to parents. Sharpest differentiator: the MGM Rewards omnichannel flywheel — a single-wallet, five-tier (Sapphire→NOIR) loyalty program redeemable for real-world hotel/dining/experience comps across 20+ MGM properties (and Marriott Bonvoy points). No digital-only rival can match the land-based redemption; in Nevada, single-wallet online+retail lifted monthly actives +19% and handle +26%. Most material weakness: a sub-scale OSB brand — BetMGM is third in sportsbook, its app is widely reviewed as more cluttered/laggier than FanDuel/DraftKings, and the headline promo ($1,500 first-bet) is high-ceiling but high-risk-skewed, not the friendliest. MGM earns top balls for iGaming, loyalty and omnichannel; it is a follower, not a leader, in the OSB acquisition race.
1 · Spend Trend-Line — the centerpiece
There is no single "MGM betting marketing" line, so the centerpiece is split into two non-additive tracks. Track A is MGM Resorts’ consolidated advertising — a filed figure, but it is resort/hospitality media (placement costs in G&A), not betting spend. Track B is BetMGM JV economics — the betting-relevant marketing, which lives off MGM’s balance sheet and is disclosed only at revenue/EBITDA level, not as an S&M dollar. Currency USD.
Track A — MGM Resorts consolidated advertising (F; resort media, not betting):
| FISCAL YEAR | S&M SPEND ($M) | YOY | YOY Δ | % OF REVENUE | SRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | 299 | ▬ | — | ~1.8% | F |
| FY2024 | 384 | ▲ | +85 | ~2.2% | F |
| FY2025 | 398 | ▲ | +14 | ~2.3% | F |
F = MGM 10-K (advertising = media placement costs, reported within G&A). % of revenue uses MGM consolidated net revenue (~$16.2B/$17.2B/$17.5B). This is HOSPITALITY advertising — it does NOT include BetMGM’s marketing (equity-method JV, below). Do not read Track A as betting spend.
Track B — BetMGM JV (50%-owned, equity-method; betting marketing lives here, S&M $ undisclosed):
| FISCAL YEAR | S&M SPEND ($M) | YOY | YOY Δ | % OF REVENUE | SRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | rev 1,900 | ▬ | — | EBITDA neg. | P |
| FY2024 | rev 2,100 | ▲ | +200 | EBITDA −244 | P |
| FY2025 | rev 2,800 | ▲ | +700 | EBITDA +220 | P |
BetMGM net revenue (P, JV releases): FY25 $2.8B (+33%) — iGaming $1.83B (+24%), OSB $903M (+63%). EBITDA +$220M FY25 (first full-year positive; +$464M swing vs −$244M FY24). BetMGM does NOT publish a marketing/S&M dollar line; spend here is INFERRED from the EBITDA inflection (rising margin + falling promo reliance) and is a gap (G) at the dollar level. The ‘spend’ column shows revenue, not S&M.
Why this looks nothing like the FanDuel / DraftKings centerpiece — and what it means
For FanDuel and DraftKings the spend trend-line IS the story (consolidated S&M vs revenue). For MGM the betting marketing is structurally invisible: it sits in a 50/50 JV that reports revenue and EBITDA but not an S&M dollar, so per the series’ sourcing rule the betting-spend dollar is flagged G, never guessed. What is disclosed and decision-useful: BetMGM reached first full-year positive EBITDA in FY2025 while growing revenue 33% and explicitly citing "reduced reliance on unsustainable promotional spend" and "sharper player management" — i.e. the efficiency inflection is real and management-stated, even though the marketing dollar is not printed. The honest read: MGM’s betting spend discipline is improving and now cash-generative (returned $270M to parents in FY25), but you cannot compute a spend ratio from filings.
Forward block. BetMGM guidance (P, 4-Feb-2026): FY2026 net revenue $3.1–3.2B and adjusted EBITDA $300–350M, reaffirming a path to $500M EBITDA by 2027 — an explicitly profitability-led (not share-grab) trajectory. MGM Resorts does not guide a consolidated advertising dollar. Analyst/modelled (E): the rising-EBITDA-on-rising-revenue shape implies BetMGM marketing intensity continues to fall as a % of GGR; no reliable spend-dollar estimate is possible from disclosure (method: none defensible — flagged G).
2 · Unit Economics
BetMGM disclosed per-player economics direction for FY2025 that are unusually granular for the cohort, even without a CAC dollar: NGR margin expansion, handle-per-active and NGR-per-active growth. Derived figures are E.
| Metric (BetMGM unless noted) | Read | Src |
|---|---|---|
| Combined US GGR share (FY25) | ~13% (#3 overall) | P |
| iGaming GGR share | ~21% — #2 in US casino | P |
| OSB GGR share | ~8% — distant #3 | P |
| Net revenue mix | iGaming $1.83B vs OSB $903M — iGaming-led (2:1) | P |
| OSB net gaming revenue margin (FY25) | +170bps YoY — structural hold + parlay mix | P |
| Handle per active / NGR per active | +26% / +77% YoY — higher-value, fewer actives | P |
| Nevada single-wallet (omnichannel) | Monthly actives +19%, handle +26% YoY | P |
| CAC $ / payback / lifetime LTV-CAC | NOT disclosed — diligence item | G |
All BetMGM operating metrics are JV-release sourced (P). The standout: NGR-per-active +77% on FEWER actives = a deliberate higher-value, iGaming-weighted player strategy, not a volume land-grab. Hard CAC/payback/LTV are undisclosed (G).
Efficiency read — reconciled to the structure
MGM/BetMGM’s efficiency story is different in kind from FanDuel’s or DraftKings’. Those two win OSB on scale + hold; BetMGM wins on iGaming mix + omnichannel loyalty. The disclosed shape — NGR-per-active +77% while active count fell, NGR margin +170bps, first positive EBITDA — is the signature of a monetisation-and-retention model leaning on high-margin casino and the MGM Rewards land-based tie-in, rather than a CAC-led acquisition machine. The honest limitations are two: (1) no published CAC/payback/LTV (G), so efficiency rests on disclosed per-active direction, not a ratio; and (2) the OSB business is sub-scale (8% share), so its standalone OSB unit economics are almost certainly weaker than the iGaming-blended numbers suggest.
3 · Brand Position & Equity
Positioning thesis. BetMGM positions on premium, trusted, casino-heritage — the black-and-gold MGM aesthetic, "the King of Sportsbooks," and an explicit lean into the MGM Resorts hospitality brand and its real-world rewards. This is a casino-first brand identity, which is exactly why it over-indexes in iGaming and under-indexes in pure OSB versus the sports-media-native FanDuel/DraftKings.
| Brand-equity axis | MGM / BetMGM | Read | Src |
|---|---|---|---|
| iGaming brand strength (US) | #2 (~21% share) | Casino heritage = natural iGaming fit | P |
| OSB brand strength (US) | #3 (~8% share) | Sub-scale vs FanDuel/DraftKings | P |
| Parent brand equity (MGM Resorts) | Iconic hospitality brand | Real-world trust + Vegas association | F |
| Owned physical network | 20+ MGM properties; Vegas Strip | STRUCTURAL — unmatched land-based asset | F |
| App experience | Premium look; reviewers flag clutter/lag vs FD/DK | Below product leaders | P |
Share figures P (JV releases / regulator data). Parent brand and property count F (10-K). App-experience read is P (aggregator consensus).
Tier-1 vs trailing read. MGM has a genuinely differentiated brand position: the only major US betting brand backed by an iconic land-based hospitality empire. That converts to real iGaming and loyalty strength. But in sports betting specifically — the category that drives mass acquisition — BetMGM is a clear third, and its product/app reputation trails the two leaders. So ‘brand strength’ is bifurcated: Tier-1 in casino/loyalty, Strong-Challenger in OSB.
4 · Channel & Campaign Mix
MGM’s defining channel advantage is its physical estate + MGM Rewards — an omnichannel acquisition and retention funnel no digital-only operator can replicate. BetMGM layers national TV/digital + sponsorships on top, and LeoVegas runs MGM’s international digital playbook separately.
| Channel / asset | Role | Structural vs rented | Src |
|---|---|---|---|
| MGM Rewards + 20+ properties (single wallet) | Omnichannel acquisition + retention | STRUCTURAL — unmatched; the core moat | F |
| Land-based cross-sell (Vegas / regional casinos) | Free funnel into BetMGM | STRUCTURAL | F |
| National TV / digital / paid social | Brand + acquisition | Rented | E |
| Sponsorships (NFL clubs, leagues) | Brand reach | Rented | P |
| LeoVegas (international) | Separate consolidated iGaming engine | Owned (ex-US) | F |
| DFS-to-OSB funnel | ABSENT — no DFS heritage | GAP vs FanDuel/DraftKings | G |
Channel-share % not disclosed (G). MGM lacks the DFS-origin funnel that FanDuel/DraftKings share — its equivalent owned funnel is the casino estate, which favours iGaming over OSB acquisition. Reads F/P/E.
Structural advantage vs rented reach
MGM’s owned funnel is physical, not digital: the casino estate + MGM Rewards single wallet. This is a genuine, unmatched moat — but it is casino-shaped, which is why it powers iGaming leadership while doing comparatively little for OSB acquisition (sports bettors are acquired through sports media, where MGM has no owned asset and trails FanDuel’s RSN network and the DFS funnels). The omnichannel single-wallet (Nevada actives +19%) is the clearest proof the physical moat works — for the casino-led part of the model.
5 · Sponsorships, Partnerships & Ambassadors
| Property / partner | Nature | Disclosed value | Src |
|---|---|---|---|
| NFL — Pittsburgh Steelers | Official partner (extended through 2029 season) | Undisclosed | P |
| NHL — St. Louis Blues | Official sports betting partner (Jan-2026) | Undisclosed | P |
| MLB Playoffs | Official bullpen sponsor (2024) | Undisclosed | P |
| Marriott Bonvoy | Rewards-points exchange partnership | Loyalty integration — n/a | P |
| MGM Resorts properties | Owned venue / event integration | Internal — n/a | F |
| NBA Cup / event sweepstakes | Promo-led activations (Vegas prize tie-ins) | Promo cost — UNCONFIRMED | P/E |
Sponsorship deal values are undisclosed (P). MGM’s sponsorship strategy uniquely leverages OWNED venues and the Vegas prize-experience hook (e.g. NBA Cup five-night MGM Grand stays) — a structural twist tied to the property estate. Do not treat any value as filed.
Strategic-fit read. MGM’s sponsorship portfolio is club/league-and-experience led rather than national-media led — individual NFL/NHL club deals plus Vegas prize-experience activations that route winners back into the MGM property estate. That is coherent with the omnichannel thesis (sponsorship feeds the loyalty flywheel) but is narrower national reach than FanDuel’s NBA/Amazon or DraftKings’ NBCU deals. Net: Strong, well-fitted to the casino/loyalty model — values press/estimate, never filed.
6 · Promotional Offer Architecture & Aggressiveness
6a · Offer-type inventory. Every distinct BetMGM promo mechanic, with terms, bonus-vs-cash treatment, frequency and source tier. The standout is MGM Rewards — a loyalty program that redeems into real-world hospitality, not just bonus bets. Terms are P (BetMGM promo pages / T&Cs) or E (aggregator triangulation); none are filed (F).
| OFFER MECHANIC | HEADLINE VALUE | KEY TERMS | BONUS / CASH | FREQUENCY | SRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welcome — First Bet (most states) | First-bet safety net up to $1,500 + $50 Rewards bonus | Refunded as 5×20% bonus bets if first bet loses; 1x playthrough; 7-day expiry; SNR | Bonus bets | Always-on (new users) | P |
| Welcome — iGaming states (MI/NJ/PA/WV) | Bet $10, get $150 in bonus bets if first bet WINS | Win-required; simpler bet-and-get; 1x | Bonus bets | Always-on (those states) | P |
| Casino welcome (BetMGM Casino) | Deposit match up to ~$2,500 + no-deposit bonus + spins (state-varying) | High playthrough; game-locked spins | Casino bonus / spins | Always-on (iGaming states) | P |
| Lion’s Boosts (odds boosts) | Enhanced daily odds on marquee games | Opt-in; market-specific; max-wager caps | Cash winnings | ~Daily | P |
| Profit boosts | +% on winnings | Opt-in; eligibility caps | Cash winnings | Frequent | P |
| No-Sweat / second-chance (sport-specific) | Stake back as bonus bet (e.g. NFL First TD Scorer; NBA One-Game Parlay) | Opt-in; per-event; cash-refund on some (First TD) | Bonus bets / cash | Event-driven | P |
| SGP boosts / pre-built parlays | Boosted same-game-parlay pricing | Opt-in; min-odds per leg | Cash winnings | Always-on | P |
| Reward Multiplier Days | Extra Rewards points on wagers | Opt-in; date-specific | Rewards points | Periodic | P |
| Reactivation / return-deposit | Targeted deposit bonus for inactive users | Targeted; occasional | Bonus bets | Targeted | P |
| Referral | Both parties get $100 in bonus bets | Friend new + deposit/wager; settle window | Bonus bets | Always-on | P |
| Loyalty — BetMGM / MGM Rewards | 5 tiers (Sapphire→Pearl→Gold→Platinum→NOIR); points + tier credits | Auto-enrol; redeem for bonus bets OR hotel/dining/comps/Marriott Bonvoy; ~20–50 pts per $100 | Bonus bets / real-world comps | Always-on | P |
| Sweepstakes (NBA Cup / event) | Wager-to-enter; Vegas experience prizes (MGM Grand stays + tickets) | Opt-in; property-tied prizes | Experience prizes | Event-driven | P |
Sources: BetMGM.com promo pages and major aggregator reviews (CBS Sports, FoxSports, SI, Covers, Sportsline, LSR), June 2026. The $1,500 first-bet is the flagship in most states; MI/NJ/PA/WV run a Bet $10/Get $150-if-win variant. All bonus bets are SNR with 1x playthrough. The defining feature is MGM Rewards redeeming into real-world hospitality — a category no digital-only rival offers. Treat all values as P, not filed.
6b · Volume & aggressiveness read. Scored vs the tier-1 reference (FanDuel) and the trailing reference (theScore Bet, PENN). Top balls reward disciplined generosity and durable retention value — not the biggest headline blitz.
| Promo axis | This operator | Tier-1 ref | Trailing ref |
|---|---|---|---|
| Headline generosity (welcome) | ● | ◕ | ● |
| Terms friendliness (playthrough / cash settle) | ◕ | ● | ◑ |
| Offer breadth (distinct live mechanics) | ◕ | ● | ◑ |
| Refresh cadence (boosts/no-sweat frequency) | ◕ | ◕ | ◑ |
| Reload / loyalty depth (real-world comps) | ● | ◑ | ◔ |
| Promo-as-margin-drag discipline (low = better) | ◕ | ● | ◔ |
MGM’s distinctive axis is loyalty depth: the only major program redeeming into hotel/dining/experience comps and Marriott Bonvoy — ●, ahead of FanDuel’s thin Players Club (◑). Its $1,500 first-bet ties the highest headline ceiling in the cohort (●), but the offer is risk-skewed toward LARGER bettors (refund-if-lose, not instant), so terms-friendliness is ◕, behind FanDuel’s cleaner structure. FanDuel retains the edge on offer breadth and margin-drag discipline (disclosed promo ~4% of GGR). theScore Bet (PENN; ESPN BET successor) matches the $1,000+ headline ceiling but is insurance-only and limits sharp bettors fast — ○ on discipline. Reads are E/P from aggregator observation; offer counts not filed.
Promo-Aggressiveness Spectrum
| Disciplined | Competitive | Aggressive | Blitz |
MGM sits at the COMPETITIVE end — with a distinctive loyalty-led, casino-weighted promo identity rather than an OSB acquisition blitz, and the evidence supports the placement. The disclosed proof of discipline is the EBITDA inflection itself: BetMGM reached first full-year positive EBITDA (+$220M) in FY2025 while management explicitly cited "reduced reliance on unsustainable promotional spend" and grew NGR-per-active +77% on FEWER actives — the opposite of a promo-fuelled top line. The promo architecture is loyalty-anchored: the real differentiator is not the $1,500 first-bet (which is a high-ceiling, large-bettor-skewed safety net, not the friendliest welcome) but the MGM Rewards real-world redemption, which converts promo dollars into retention via hospitality comps no rival can offer. The honest tension a tough marker must flag: the casino-weighted model means the OSB promo proposition is comparatively undifferentiated — in pure sports betting MGM competes on the same boosts/no-sweat mechanics as everyone else, without FanDuel’s terms discipline or DraftKings’ boost breadth, which is part of why its OSB share sits at ~8%.
7 · Regulatory & Responsible-Marketing Exposure
BetMGM carries category-standard US state-by-state advertising/RG constraints, works with GameSense for RG messaging, and has begun phasing out credit-card funding (from Mar-2026) — a proactive RG-marketing posture. As a hospitality parent, MGM Resorts also carries broad gaming-regulatory, AML and (notably) cybersecurity exposure across its property estate. BetMGM has not (publicly) launched a prediction-markets product on the scale of FanDuel Predicts / DraftKings Predictions, leaving it less exposed to the CFTC contest but also less positioned for that emerging category.
Litigation / regulatory — unproven / contested / specific action noted
Specific noted action: the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board fined BetMGM $100,000 for a "failure to prevent fraudulent activity" (reported 2026). This is a disclosed regulatory penalty, noted factually and contained here; it is a fraud-prevention/controls matter, not an advertising-content finding, and is not characterised beyond the reported fact. More broadly, MGM and BetMGM are, in the ordinary course, subject to regulatory actions and putative litigation across jurisdictions (including advertising-substantiation and promotional-language matters). Save for the specific PA fine noted above, these are allegations or pending matters — unproven and contested, with no adverse findings asserted here; MGM/BetMGM dispute claims against them in the ordinary course. All such matters are contained to this one labelled box and not sensationalised. MGM has also historically disclosed a material cybersecurity incident (2023) — a trust/brand-exposure surface, noted as context, not a marketing finding.
8 · Build / Buy / Partner Read
| Weak / exposed pillar | Gap | Build / Buy / Partner | Difficulty |
|---|---|---|---|
| OSB share / sports-media reach | #3 in OSB; no owned sports-media funnel | PARTNER/BUILD — media/streaming deals; hard to close vs FD/DK | Hard |
| App product quality | Clutter/lag reputation vs FD/DK | BUILD — UX/performance investment | Medium |
| DFS / sports-acquisition funnel | No DFS heritage | BUY/BUILD — or accept casino-led model | Medium/Hard |
| Prediction-markets brand | No scaled product yet | BUILD + PARTNER — later mover | Medium |
| Betting-spend transparency | Off-balance-sheet JV; no S&M disclosure | BUILD — JV disclosure choice | Easy (JV) |
Operator lens, vendor-neutral. No investment recommendation. ‘Difficulty’ is qualitative effort, not cost. Note: MGM’s STRENGTHS (iGaming, loyalty, omnichannel) need no build — they are structural and lead the market.
9 · Tier-1 vs Trailing Synthesis
Weighted Harvey-ball comparison — MGM/BetMGM vs the tier-1 reference (FanDuel) and the trailing reference (theScore Bet, PENN). Balls reward demonstrable efficiency/leadership/loyalty, not budget size. Note MGM’s bifurcation: Tier-1 in iGaming/loyalty, Strong-Challenger in OSB.
| Marketing pillar (weight) | MGM / BetMGM | FanDuel (T1 ref) | theScore Bet (trail ref) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spend / promo efficiency (25%) | ◕ | ● | ◔ |
| Unit economics (20%) | ◕ | ● | ◔ |
| Brand equity — iGaming (8%) | ● | ◕ | ◑ |
| Brand equity — OSB (7%) | ◑ | ● | ◔ |
| Channel / omnichannel assets (15%) | ● | ◕ | ◑ |
| Sponsorship fit (10%) | ◕ | ◕ | ◑ |
| Loyalty / promo depth (10%) | ● | ◑ | ◔ |
| Reg / RG-marketing posture (5%) | ◑ | ◑ | ◑ |
MGM’s decisive edges over FanDuel are iGaming brand (#2 casino), omnichannel assets (physical estate), and loyalty depth (real-world comps). FanDuel decisively edges MGM on OSB brand, spend/promo efficiency and unit economics. theScore Bet (PENN), the ~3%-share ESPN BET successor, trails across the board despite a high headline reset.
Harvey-ball scale ○ Unfit / Trailing◔ Weak◑ Moderate◕ Strong● Excellent / Leading
Verdict — maturity tier & the moves that matter
Strong Challenger overall — but Tier-1 in iGaming and loyalty. MGM is not trying to out-FanDuel FanDuel in sports betting, and on the evidence it shouldn’t: it is a casino-and-hospitality marketing organisation whose betting arm wins where its DNA is strongest (iGaming #2, loyalty #1, omnichannel unmatched) and trails where it isn’t (OSB #3). The FY2025 EBITDA inflection (+$220M, first profit, $270M to parents) validates a profitability-led, loyalty-anchored model. The three moves that matter: (1) close the OSB product/UX gap — the app’s clutter/lag reputation directly caps sports acquisition; (2) extend the omnichannel single-wallet nationally — the Nevada result (+19% actives) is the clearest proof the physical moat works and should be everywhere legal; (3) weaponise MGM Rewards harder as the retention differentiator — it is the one thing no digital-only rival can copy. The honest caveat throughout: BetMGM’s betting marketing spend, CAC, payback and lifetime LTV/CAC are undisclosed (off-balance-sheet JV), so the entire efficiency case rests on disclosed revenue/EBITDA inflection and per-active direction — not on any published spend ratio.
· Known / Unknown / Diligence Register
| Item | Status | Tag |
|---|---|---|
| MGM consolidated advertising (resort media) | KNOWN — 10-K ($398M FY25) | F |
| BetMGM betting marketing / S&M $ line | UNKNOWN — off-balance-sheet JV; not disclosed | G |
| BetMGM revenue / EBITDA / share (FY25) | KNOWN — JV releases | P |
| BetMGM FY26 guidance ($3.1–3.2B / $300–350M) | KNOWN — 4-Feb-2026 | P |
| Per-active metrics (NGR/active +77%, etc.) | KNOWN — JV release | P |
| CAC $ / payback / lifetime LTV-CAC | UNKNOWN | G |
| Promo offer terms (BetMGM) | KNOWN — promo pages + aggregators (current) | P |
| Offer volume (count of live promos) | PARTIAL — observed, varies by state/day | E/G |
| MGM Rewards tier mechanics | KNOWN — published program terms | P |
| Sponsorship deal values | UNKNOWN/EST — press only | P/E |
| PA Gaming fine ($100k, fraud-prevention) | KNOWN — reported regulatory action | P |
| LeoVegas standalone marketing economics | UNKNOWN — not separately broken out | G |
Every UNKNOWN tagged G is a diligence item, not a failure score. The teardown stays tough on what IS visible (share, EBITDA inflection, per-active direction, loyalty mechanics, the omnichannel result) and explicit about what is not — especially the structurally-invisible JV betting spend.
Operator-capability marketing teardown — internal decision-support, not investment advice. Figures source-tagged F/P/E/G; estimates labelled order-of-magnitude. Prepared from public filings and trade media; no confidential or third-party internal information.
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